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FOREWORD
Populism has received very little attention from military
planners. This is understandable. As a political phenomenon, it is
viewed as somewhat removed from security concerns and hence as
more legitimately within the purview of those members of the U.S.
policy community who deal with political issues. Furthermore, as a
dynamic, unstable, and ephemeral phenomenon within seemingly
stable representative democracies, it is hard to “see” and hence
to study. This makes trend extrapolation regarding the growth of
populist movements much more difﬁcult than for other future
security challenges such as terrorism or unconventional war.
In this monograph, Dr. Steve C. Ropp questions whether the
enormous potential strategic consequences of a future burst of
populist turbulence in Europe or South America suggest that it be
more carefully studied. As Dr. Ropp indicates in his analysis, such
bursts of turbulence have dramatically altered the U.S. security
environment in the past, present new challenges today, and could
provide even greater ones in the future.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
on populism as part of the continuing debate about the nature of
the challenges and opportunities facing the United States in coming
decades. The analysis contained herein should prove particularly
useful to those within the security community who are concerned
with the second and third order consequences of the successful
spread of representative democracy in Europe and South America.
It reﬂects information, available through March of 2005, regarding
populist dynamics in these two important regions.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War provided the United States with an
enormous opportunity to reshape the national security environment,
not only militarily but also economically and politically. Militarily,
old alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
have been enlarged and retooled, while new partnerships have
developed elsewhere to deal with challenges such as humanitarian
relief and complex emergencies. Economically, a consensus has
increased as to the value of market mechanisms as tools for the
promotion of development and sustained economic growth.
And politically, processes of democratization have expanded the
number of countries in the world that are either partially or fully
democratic.
At the same time, our very success in this regard has created
the preconditions for future bursts of populist turbulence in two
democratic regions of the world where the United States has vital
security interests―Europe and South America. Populist politicians
already have altered the security environment in both regions and
are likely to alter it more dramatically. Were bursts of populist
turbulence to occur in either or both regions on a large scale, they
would have the potential to undermine the democratic core upon
which most of contemporary U.S. security policy is based. And in
some regions, such as the Andes, where democratic institutions are
particularly fragile, populist turbulence could even lead to state
failure.
The potential rise of populism in Europe and South America
should not be viewed by policy planners as posing just another
speciﬁc type of security threat. For unlike the traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, or disruptive ones normally considered in future
scenarios, populism poses a potential challenge to the underlying
political substructure that has given us the collective material
capability and moral legitimacy to deal with all of these threats. In
the ﬁnal analysis, our ability to project power to deal with the whole
spectrum of security challenges that the United States will face in the
future depends upon our ability to deal with the potential challenges
emerging from within representative democracy itself.
v

This monograph takes a fresh look at the contemporary populist
phenomenon in Europe and the Americas. It describes populism,
discusses the global context in which it is emerging, and then paints
a picture of its general characteristics in four subregions in Europe
and South America. It concludes with four recommendations for
strategic planners as to how best to deal with it and with its potential
consequences.
Speciﬁcally, these recommendations include:
1. Considering possible bursts of populist turbulence to be on a par with
other major security challenges in terms of future planning. This would
suggest that strategic planners will need to educate themselves
concerning the history and current nature of populism, particularly
in their regional areas of responsibility. Policymakers should
consider revising the U.S. National Security Strategy so as to reﬂect
the importance of political systems and dynamics that cannot be
classiﬁed as either fully democratic or totalitarian.
2. Focusing policy on containing populist movements before they come
to power. Populists by deﬁnition use direct forms of political action to
gain power within representative democracies and are thus inclined
to continue using such techniques once power has been achieved.
Although it may not always be easy or diplomatically feasible to
inﬂuence the trajectory of populist politicians, efforts should be made
to do so. The ultimate goal of policy should be to aid our democratic
allies in their efforts to “mainstream” populist politicians and their
movements.
3. Avoiding forming alliances of convenience with populists. In some
cases, populist politicians in Europe and South America may support
U.S. short-term political or military goals in order to “gain traction”
domestically and/or internationally. Given the importance that
preserving the institutional integrity of representative democracy
has with regard to the achievement of long-term U.S. security goals,
strategic thinkers should resist the temptation to sacriﬁce these goals
for any short-term gain.
4. Conﬁguring U.S. military forces so that they are capable of dealing
with the wide variety of challenges that individual populists or a larger burst
of turbulence might present. Depending on the country and region, such
challenges could run the gamut from state failure to rapid changes
in the identities and associated strategic interests of powerful and
vi

internally coherent states. Although determination of the precise
nature of such conﬁgurations is the purview of military experts, the
possibility of future bursts of populist turbulence would seem to call
for preservation of the broadest range of combat capabilities.
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THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE
OF POPULISM IN EUROPE AND SOUTH AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, viewers of Netherlands public television
voted by phone and e-mail for the person that they thought should
be considered the “greatest Dutchman of all time.” The resulting top
ten list represented the ﬂower of Dutch politics and culture. William
of Orange who had guaranteed the country’s independence from
the Spanish in the 16th century came in second, and other historical
luminaries such as Anne Frank, Erasmus, Rembrandt, and Vincent
Van Gogh also made the list. But the person voted the “greatest
Dutchman of all time” by his contemporaries was a formerly obscure
gay university professor named Pim Fortuyn (biographical sketch
in appendix). The political career of this dynamic Dutchman lasted
only 6 short months before he was assassinated on May 6, 2002, on
the eve of general elections.1 However, his anti-Islamic message still
ﬁnds a receptive audience in the Netherlands where there is a large
Muslim population.
On the other side of Europe in that continent’s second largest
country, another young politician became increasingly visible
as a participant in a tense electoral stand-off. In the Ukraine, the
October 2004 election pitted a former Prime Minister and Westernoriented advocate of market reforms (Viktor Yushchenko) against
an Eastern-oriented sitting Prime Minister allied with Russia (Viktor
Yanukovich). When Yanukovich won the November 21 runoff
under conditions that most international observers felt failed to meet
international standards of transparency, Yushchenko supporters
took to the streets of Kiev. Among those stirring up the crowd was an
outspoken and telegenic member of Parliament, Yulia Tymoshenko.
By most accounts, the country’s wealthiest woman and a political
ally of Yuschenko, she at one point invited her supporters to join her
in storming the legislative building.2
Meanwhile, on another continent halfway round the world,
a powerfully-built “ﬁrebrand” of a former army colonel currently
governs Venezuela. Born to schoolteacher parents in a small rural
1

town, President Hugo Chavez is much better known within the U.S.
security community than either Pim Fortuyn or Yulia Tymoshenko.
President Chavez has governed the oil-rich South American country
of Venezuela for the past 6 years and has increasingly done so
through the use of presidential decree laws. Since surviving a recall
referendum in August 2004, through which the political opposition
attempted to have him ousted from ofﬁce, he has further consolidated
his power. And Chavez has sought to extend his inﬂuence regionally
through the promotion of values that he associates with Latin
America’s great 19th century revolutionary hero, Simon Bolivar.
Finally, a ruggedly handsome 45-year-old Bolivian indigenous
leader has become a major participant in the ongoing struggle
over that country’s political and physical survival. Opposition-led
demonstrations in October 2003 in the capitol city of La Paz resulted
in the death of a number of participants and to the ﬂight into exile of
President Gonzalo Sanchez Lozada. As a consequence, his successor,
Carlos Mesa, has governed in uneasy alliance with the indigenous
supporters of Evo Morales.3 Morales’ peasant roots in the Andean
heartland of Bolivia have given his political message resonance in a
region ﬁlled with impoverished farmers. His Movement to Socialism
(MAS) party is now the largest political force in the country.
As intriguing as their individual stories may be, why should anyone
in the U.S. strategic community take more than a passing interest
in these four political ﬁgures? This monograph suggests that we
should be very interested because they may represent, in William
Shakespeare’s famous words, “the baby ﬁgure of the giant mass
of things to come.”4 Although participating in politics in different
regions and on two different continents, each of them became
a dynamic force in national politics within a very short period of
time. Each has become such a force within either a well-established
or newly-formed representative democracy. And each has emerged
in a country whose people are under great stress because of global
change. Most importantly for our purposes here, each is a populist
who quickly carved out a personal political “space” within the
framework of representative democratic institutions.
Populism is a concept that needs to be discussed brieﬂy because
of the variety of deﬁnitions that are sometimes used to capture its
essence. Because populist political ﬁgures ﬁrst appeared in countries
2

around the world that were rapidly industrializing, there has been a
tendency to associate it exclusively with the dislocations and stress
experienced by blue collar workers, and thus with left-wing politics.
The problem with this deﬁnition is that Europeans today tend to
associate populism in countries like France, Germany, and Italy with
right-wing politics. Thus, we clearly need to look beyond simply the
politics of the Left and the Right to see what populism is really all
about.
Populism can make its presence felt among any group of
ordinary people in any democratic country which is being subjected
to stressful forces. As a result of such stress, this group of people
may identify itself with a leader who they believe can provide
them with more material support and hope for the future than the
elite politicians running the country. Indeed, the whole dynamic
supporting populism relies on the fact that some group of ordinary
citizens does not view the government as legitimately and properly
representing their interests. As a consequence, they lose respect for
the institutions associated with representative democracy (political
parties, legislatures, courts) and are perfectly willing to bypass these
institutions when necessary through recourse to direct political
action.5 Such direct political action often (though not always)
involves some measure of illegality. It frequently takes the perfectly
legal form of using referendums to bypass national institutions.6
Populism always expresses itself in the form of a direct and
unmediated relationship between “the people” and their leader. This
leader is typically charismatic―meaning that, by force of personality
and sheer animal magnetism, he or she can form a direct bond with
followers. In the modern media age, this dynamic and outspoken
leader is also usually handsome/beautiful or otherwise ruggedly
“compelling” in a movie star kind of way. And there is good reason
why populists possess these personal attributes. Given the grip
that elite politicians have on traditional representative democratic
institutions and the media, the populist leader needs to present his
or her ideas theatrically to bypass these institutions and to reach the
“chosen people” directly.7
As will be discussed in greater detail later, populism is a force
that is eroding the institutional foundations of liberal representative
democracy in a wide range of countries in Europe and South America.
3

And it is evident that a number of existing U.S. security dilemmas
in both regions already are associated with the handful of populist
politicians that have been used here as examples. The Netherlands
has been a reliable ally in the War on Terrorism, and yet it is a country
haunted by the populist “ghost” of Pim Fortuyn.8 In the Ukraine,
populist sentiment triggered by the disputed presidential elections
and their aftermath threatens to complicate U.S. relationships with
both it and Russia.9 In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez’s policies vastly
complicate the regional strategic equation. And Evo Morales “copresidential” relationship with Carlos Mesa creates a dilemma with
regard to implementation of U.S. drug control policies.
However important these individual security dilemmas might
appear to be, they pale in comparison to those that could emerge.
The rapid rise of additional populist politicians within existing
representative democracies in Europe and South America would
have far more profound implications for U.S. national security. The
strategic political context is no longer that of the Cold War where
authoritarian regimes of various kinds predominated in Central and
Eastern Europe and Latin America, while traditional representative
democracies governed in Western Europe. Rather, it is one in
which a wide variety of seemingly but not necessarily stable and
obviously unstable democracies occupy the political landscape in
both regions.
Paradoxically, the successful end of the Cold War has created
new challenges for those concerned with the relationship between
national security issues and democratic governance. Democracies
in the “New Europe” such as Ukraine are under tremendous stress,
partly because they are new but also because of strains imposed by
the transition to market economies. Democracies in the “Old Europe”
are under similar pressure from the forces of globalization, as well as
from those associated with expansion of the European Union (EU)
in 2004. And throughout South America, representative democracies
suffer from the stresses and anxieties of publics attempting to adjust
to the forces of change.
The “bottom line” for those involved in thinking about national
security policy is that we can no longer take for granted the democratic
base that the old Cold War environment provided to the United States
in Europe and South America. Forces for change are afoot which
4

render the assumption that we can treat this base as a “constant”
in our security equation increasingly problematical. These same
forces make problematical the assumption that we can deal with
both Europe and the Americas as if ever increasing levels of stable
representative democracy can undergird future U.S. security policy.
Rather, recent developments suggest just the opposite. Future bursts
of populist turbulence in these two vital regions of the world could
occur, with the whole becoming larger than the sum of its parts.
The following sections of this monograph ﬁrst describe the
current economic and political context for the rise of populism in
Europe and South America. This is followed by a discussion of why
so little attention has been paid to populism within the U.S. security
community, and why more attention should be paid. A more indepth discussion of the nature of populism follows, and a framework
is presented that suggests the type of democracies in which it is
most likely to appear in the future. The last sections describe the
general nature of the populist terrain in four subregions―“Old
Europe,” “New Europe,” the Southern Cone, and the Andean region
of South America.10 Regional and transregional scenarios for the
rise of populism and associated bursts of turbulence are presented,
followed by a discussion of their security implications and some
associated recommendations for policymakers.
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR THE RISE OF POPULISM
Although the premise of this monograph is that U.S. policymakers
should be particularly concerned by the future security challenges that
could be created by bursts of populism in Europe and South America,
various global changes are eroding support for representative
democracy in other world regions as well. Scholars and civic leaders
increasingly are concerned about the so-called “democratic deﬁcit,” a
tendency for citizens to disengage from organized party politics and
hence, in some ways, to stop thinking of themselves as citizens. And
strange as it may seem, popular support for the key institutions of
representative democracy is declining almost as rapidly in developed
countries as it is in less developed ones.
Many observers attribute declining levels of civic engagement
in developed countries to domestic environments in which a
5

combination of growing consumer wealth, expanding leisure time,
and a pervasive media presence have reduced the appeal of local
“retail politics.” Going to vote is viewed as less exciting than making
a trip to the mall. In the face of a constant barrage of advertisements,
adults in various representative democracies (particularly young
adults) increasingly have come to view themselves as consumers ﬁrst
and citizens second.11 Thus, while other reasons for declining civic
engagement may be important, the primary explanation seems to be
that the institutions of representative democracy are increasingly in
competition with other more dynamic forces in the larger society.
As for why support for representative democracy is declining
in developing countries, the reasons have more to do with concrete
“bread and butter” issues. In regions such as “New Europe,” the
Andes, or South America’s Southern Cone, the democratic deﬁcit
often results not so much from competition from consumerism,
but rather from the stress and uncertainties associated with
transitioning to a market economy. To the extent that the institutions
of representative democracy are seen as not “delivering the goods”
in this respect, the public will look elsewhere for solutions to its
daily problems. This public disenchantment with representative
democracy in developing countries is reﬂected in both low voter
turnout for national elections and in declining levels of public trust
for democratic institutions.12
Also underlying the general decline in support in Europe and
South America for representative democratic institutions are stresses
and uncertainties related to ongoing processes of globalization. As
some observers have pointed out, economic and cultural globalization
has not taken place as rapidly as its critics would suggest.13 However,
it is not so much the reality of globalization but rather people’s
perception of it that has raised levels of concern throughout both
regions.14
In the western part of Europe, people of all political persuasions
fear that their economic security will be undermined not only by
increased exports from non-European low-wage countries such as
China, but also by future exports from the EU’s newest member
states. This has led to increasing calls for protectionist measures
and for curbs on the activities of multinational corporations. The
fears and stresses associated with globalization are pronounced,
6

particularly in countries such as Germany that are important
industrial exporting countries and hence subject to job losses and
wage depression.15 And they are reﬂected in recent public opinion
polls that show rapidly rising levels of pessimism about the impact
of EU expansion, particularly in Central Europe.16 As for people in
European countries lying farther to the east, economic security is
now by far the greatest policy concern.17
The stresses and uncertainties associated with globalization are
also present throughout South America. There, the transition to
open market economies in the 1990s increased income inequality
in most countries, led to a rise in urban unemployment, and to a
widening gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers.18
These harsh economic realities are, in turn, reﬂected in pessimistic
attitudes about the impact of globalization.19 Discontent with regard
to globalization and concerns regarding their economic future are
pronounced particularly among people in Andean countries. For
example, some 92 percent of those recently polled in Ecuador and
Peru said that things were not going well in their countries.20 And
only 19 percent of all Latin Americans expressed satisfaction in the
performance of their market economies.21
As economic stresses continue to grow, levels of support for
representative democratic government further decline. Public
distrust today of democratic institutions within the 15 “original”
members of the EU is nothing less than shocking. Only 16 percent of
citizens trust their political parties and only 35 percent their national
parliaments. The overall level of trust in national governments
now stands at 30 percent. By way of contrast, television earns the
trust of 54 percent, the army 63 percent, and the police, 65 percent.
Most strikingly, political parties are the least trusted institution, and
national governments are less trusted than the EU and the United
Nations (UN) (see Table 1).22
To make matters worse, levels of public trust in democratic
institutions are even lower in the EU’s new member states. Here,
political parties only hold the loyalties of 7 percent of the people and
an incredibly low 3 percent in Poland. At the other end of the “trust
spectrum” stand the media (radio and television) and the army with
trust levels in the 60 percent range. More signiﬁcantly, the levels of
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trust for the three institutional pillars of representative democracy
(political parties, parliament, and the judiciary) are higher in Latin
American countries than in the newly admitted members of the
EU.23

Parties
Parliament
Legal system
Television
Police
Army

OLD
EUROPE

NEW
EUROPE

LATIN
AMERICA

16
35
43
54
65
63

7
16
27
57
42
58

18
24
32
38
37
40

Table 1. Percent of Levels of Trust in Democratic Institutions
(“Old Europe,” “New Europe,” and Latin America).
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that both European
and South American political parties and party systems are under a
lot of stress. Particularly in South America, parties have proliferated
rapidly. For example, Argentina now has 47; Venezuela, 37; and
Bolivia, 14.24 And while the number of parties is more limited in
Europe due to high electoral thresholds for admission, they are
relatively numerous and ideologically diverse throughout the region.
Furthermore, support for old mainstream parties in countries such as
the Netherlands, Italy, Argentina, and Uruguay has eroded rapidly,
threatening the “hollowing out” of these systems and hence movement toward more extreme types of multiparty conﬁgurations.25
In sum, the general context for possible future bursts of populist
turbulence in both Europe and South America is one where there
has been a noticeable recent decline in civic engagement and
an increasing democratic deﬁcit. As a result of the stresses and
uncertainties associated with globalization and other factors, levels
of trust in democratic institutions have declined. The general effect
has been to create a volatile and expanded public “space” within
the crumbling democratic ediﬁce for a new generation of populist
politicians.
8

WHY THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF POPULISM
HAVE NOT RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION
As compared to other types of political phenomena, populism has
received very little attention. For example, only about 2 percent of the
14,000 books in print on democracy and various forms of authoritarian
rule deal with the subject of populism.26 It seems to be viewed within
this vast literature as a mildly interesting “hybrid” form of political
rule that does not ﬁt neatly into any of the conventional conceptual
boxes.
And until recently, populism has received very little attention
within the U.S. foreign policy and security community.27 The National
Security Strategy makes no mention of populism as a potential security
problem. Indeed, it posits a simple two-part distinction between
democratic and totalitarian political systems, with democracy
mentioned 20 times and totalitarianism 3 times. The National Security
Strategy also suggests that there is a general global movement away
from totalitarian forms of government and towards democracy, and
support for such a trend is posited as one of the U.S. national goals.
Given this perspective on democracy, it is hardly surprising that
the National Security Strategy does not mention the possibility of the
future erosion of existing liberal democratic institutions or of the
implications such a development would have for national security.
Rather, the strategy suggests that the expansion of the “family of
transatlantic democracies” can reliably serve as a political support
base for the maintenance or expansion of military alliances such as
NATO.28
Why is populism such an understudied political phenomenon
within the U.S. security community? Part of the reason is the abovementioned analytical bias toward a view of global democratic
processes that is linear and unidirectional. But populism is also
hard to “see.” Because it is a dynamic, unstable, and ephemeral
force operating within representative democracies, it is as difﬁcult
to pin down as are quarks by physicists. Compare, for example, the
difﬁculty of studying the illusive and dynamic populist to that of
studying a well-known democratic leader, dictator, or even terrorist.
Unlike a Tony Blair, Kim Jong-il, or Osama Bin Laden, a populist
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leader such as Pim Fortuyn literally can explode upon the political
scene and often just as quickly vanish from it.
Populism is also neglected because we Americans tend to view
it as a rather benign or, at worst, slightly malignant force found
within a generally healthy democratic body politic. This perspective
on populism is the product of our own unique historical experience
with it. Who are the populists who come to mind when we think
about this American experience, and what were the consequences of
their brief sojourns on the national political stage? While the likes
of Senator William Jennings Bryan, Father Charles Coughlin, and
Governor George Wallace may not be revered ﬁgures in the pantheon
of great American politicians, they did little long-run damage to
representative democracy. Thus, as a result of this perspective
on populism, our strategic planners tend to view its appearance
in various other countries as an isolated problem amenable to a
diplomatic solution rather than as a potential security challenge
requiring advanced strategic planning.29
Our inattention to the security implications of populism also
results from the fact that the last great burst of populist turbulence
in Europe and South America occurred more than 60 years ago.
In Europe, Benito Mussolini exploded onto the Italian democratic
political scene in 1919 when he ﬁrst ran for a seat in Parliament. A
short 2 years later, the King of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III, asked
him to form a new government. While Adolph Hitler emerged less
quickly within Germany’s post-World War I democratic Weimar
Republic, he eventually formed part of a larger cluster of populist
politicians who governed on two continents. Mussolini and Hitler’s
counterparts in South America included populist ﬁgures such as
President Getulio Vargas of Brazil and Juan Peron of Argentina.
Although a major outbreak of Transatlantic populism has not
occurred recently, Latin America did experience what might be
considered a regional “mini-burst” some 3 decades ago.30 Beginning
with Fidel Castro’s ascension to power in Cuba (1959) and through
the mid-1970s, a number of populist leaders held sway in a small
subset of the region’s countries. These included Panama under
General Omar Torrijos Herrera (1968-81) and Peru under General
Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75). Most of these leaders were populist,
both in terms of their style and also in terms of the radical-reformist
10

policies they pursued. And this “mini-burst” of populist turbulence
created major security problems for the United States, including the
threat of Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Cuba (the
Cuban Missile Crisis) and the possibility of new security threats to
the Panama Canal.31
WHY WE NEED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO POPULISM
Given the large number of major security threats already facing
the United States today (traditional, irregular, disruptive, and
catastrophic), why should we pay more attention to populism?32
Three main reasons are:33
• Because populism has shown an ability in the past to quickly
and dramatically alter the strategic environment in Europe
and South America in ways that caught U.S. planners off
guard;
• Because populism already has changed the strategic
environment in Europe and South America―and could change
it even more dramatically in the near future; and,
• Because such bursts of populist turbulence would unsettle
the core area of representative democracies―increasing the
general level of strategic uncertainty and undermining the
political base from which U.S. military power has collectively
been projected.
With regard to the ﬁrst of these points, the last great burst of
populist turbulence in the 1920s and 1930s dramatically altered the
political terrain in Europe and South America in a few short years.
However, U.S. strategic planners remained oblivious to its potential
consequences because of a deeply grounded belief in the inevitable
march toward democracy after World War I.34
As a consequence, U.S. military planning between the wars was
dominated by scenarios that envisioned no major strategic threats
emanating from changes within representative democracies in
Europe and the Americas. Rather, such scenarios focused on “minor”
global contingencies such as dealing with possible political unrest
in the Philippines or in Mexico. It was not until the late 1930s that
11

planners realized that the strategic environment had been altered
dramatically by bursts of populist turbulence in both Europe and
South America. By that time, it was much too late to redesign U.S.
force structures or change military operational plans.35
Second, we need to pay more attention to populism because
it already has altered the strategic operational environment in
both regions over the past few years. As mentioned above, rising
populist sentiment in the Ukraine as the result of recent elections has
threatened to complicate U.S. relations with Russia. And President
Yushchenko’s selection of populist Tymoshenko to be Ukraine’s
Prime Minister makes it tempting for U.S. policymakers to pursue
short-term policy goals at the expense of putting the institutional
integrity of Ukraine’s ﬂedgling democracy more at risk.36 For
example, it becomes tempting to ignore populist developments in a
case such as this where the government has provided considerable
support for U.S. policy in Iraq.37
Another example drawn from South America further illustrates
how populism has already altered the strategic operational
environment. Until 1998, when military populist Chavez was elected
president of Venezuela, there had been no credible spokesperson in
the region for an alternative political and economic vision of the
future of the Americas. Chavez’s articulation of such an alternative
Bolivarian vision has in the process created a number of strategic
dilemmas for U.S. policymakers. Should we treat his brand of
populism as a legitimate regional variant of representative democracy,
or treat it as a threatening new form of authoritarianism? What are
the security implications of his increasingly close ties to Cuba, Russia,
and China? And should we be concerned from a security standpoint
with his efforts to create a new “petro-alliance,” both within Latin
America and across the globe?38
That Chavez’s unique brand of populism already has changed the
strategic equation for the United States in Latin America is perhaps
best illustrated by the growing concern within the U.S. policy
community about energy security. In November 2004, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committtee Senator Richard Lugar
expressed this concern in a letter to the Government Accountability
Ofﬁce (GAO). In the letter, he requested that the GAO look into U.S.
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preparations for another disruption of the supply of energy from
Venezuela. The concern was not only with disruptive actions that
President Chavez might take but also those of the opposition in a
highly polarized post-referendum political environment.39
The third and ﬁnal reason for closely following populist
developments in Europe and South America is by far the most
important. Future bursts of populist turbulence have the potential to
unsettle the collective democratic core of countries that undergirds
much of U.S. military security policy.40 Such a political turn of events
in either or both of these regions would have multiple negative
consequences for those concerned with military-related security
issues.
As a result of populist turbulence, there would be less ability
to build structural certainty into future security planning. In other
words, U.S. strategic planners would have a much reduced ability to
take certain things that might or might not happen for granted. Take,
for example, the current situation with regard to the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) efforts to bring Iranian nuclear
programs under an international inspection regime. Strategic military
planners fairly safely can assume in this context that representative
democracies in South America that do not presently possess nuclear
weapons (such as Brazil and Argentina) are likely to assent to
inspection regimes and safeguards similar to those being urged on
Iran.41 But would this remain the case under conditions of populist
turbulence?42
Future populist turbulence in Europe and South America would
also lessen our ability to collectively and reliably project military
power into troubled regions and to deal with the growing problem of
failed or failing states. This core area of representative democracies
served as the political base from which U.S. strategic planners were
able to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And following
the end of the Cold War, collective diplomatic and military power
was used to deal with post-Cold War crises and peacekeeping/
peacemaking situations such as those which developed in Iraq and
the Balkans.43
But what might we expect under conditions of widespread
populist turbulence in either or both regions? Here, Venezuela can
serve as an example. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, this
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representative democracy played an important role in collective
regional efforts to bring the civil wars in Central America to a close.44
Under the leadership of President Luis Herrera Campins (1979-84),
Venezuela became a founding member of the so-called Contadora
Group in 1983. Together with Colombia, Brazil, and Panama, it
served as an “honest broker” in efforts to ﬁnd political solutions to
the ongoing conﬂict in the region.
In the process of working toward such political solutions in
Central America, Venezuela also became a major contributor to UN
observer groups that were dispatched in the late 1980s and 1990s
to monitor and enforce cease ﬁres in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
In fact, the Venezuelan troop battalion sent to Nicaragua in 1989
constituted 75 percent of the military force stationed there under UN
auspices. However, today under populist governance, Venezuela’s
contribution to UN peacekeeping missions has been minimal.45
The current “meltdown” in Haiti provides another example of
how a future increase in populist turbulence in the democratic core
might be expected to impact our ability to collectively and reliably
project power into troubled regions of the world, including some
that are very close to the United States. Following the removal of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from ofﬁce in February 2004, the
UN has assumed the role of a “virtual government” in this failed
Caribbean state.46
Under such conditions, what effect would future populist
turbulence in the Southern Cone have on U.S. and UN ability to
deal with the security and humanitarian problems associated with
Haitian state collapse? If we look at the composition of the 6,000
military personnel that the UN has deployed there, the majority come
from the Southern Cone democracies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Uruguay.47 And these troops (under Brazilian command) are all that
currently ensures that the country will not descend into chaos.
What kinds of adjustments in force deployment would the
U.S. military have to contemplate if any or all of these Southern
Cone countries were to experience populist turbulence that led
their governments to reassess their current level of military troop
commitments to present and future stabilization operations in the
Americas?48 And more broadly, what kinds of adjustments would
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we need to contemplate in terms of global force deployment? During
the ﬁrst 4 years of the new millennium, the contribution of Latin
America’s democracies to global peacekeeping operations and efforts
to deal with humanitarian emergencies has increased dramatically.
A reversal of this trend would put greater pressure on U.S. military
personnel.49
With regard to our current need to pay additional attention to
the strategic implications of populism, we face a dilemma. Our very
success in promoting the spread of representative democracy in the
former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Americas
following the end of the Cold War has resulted in the creation of
institutional structures that are often fragile at best. The forces of
grassroots democracy that the process of democratization has
unleashed threaten to overwhelm representative institutions in
countries where these institutions are either over- or underdeveloped
(see Table 2). Under such conditions, populists who have the ability
to directly connect with “the people,” or even shape peoples’ views
of their collective identity, will be empowered to reshape democracy
itself.50
Phase 1: Major global and/or regional changes undermine
institutions in representative democracies.
Phase 2: Populist leaders emerge to reﬂect the stresses and
uncertainties shared by “the people” in these democracies.
Phase 3: New regional “clusters” of populist-led countries form
around common interests or even new ideologies.
Phase 4: Bursts of populist turbulence occur in and among these
countries.
Phase 5: New security challenges quickly appear for the United
States.
Table 2. How Populism Could Create New Security Challenges
in Europe and South America.
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HOW POPULISM WORKS
The strategic implications of populism do not arise from the nature
of populism itself, but rather from the political context in which it is
found. In fact, in a healthy representative democracy, it can provide
a form of “therapy.” It can do this by regularly reminding governing
political elites that they ultimately must prove themselves responsive
to the will of the people or the people will ﬁnd an alternative route
(through populist leaders) of making their voices heard. As pointed
out earlier, this has happened many times in the history of the United
States.
Stable democracies have shown themselves to be adaptable over
time, a characteristic that is not always evident in democracies around
the world.51 More commonly, representative democracies are either
too rigid and “set in their ways,” or too ﬂuid and hence volatile.
Overly stable democracies (rigid ones) result either from the imposition
of democratic structures by outside Great Powers following a war
(for example, Austria following World War II) or from efforts by
domestic elites to ensure “social peace” (Venezuela during the Cold
War).52 In either case, the structures of representative democracy
were consciously engineered by political leaders to contain, and hence
limit the impulses of “the people” to express themselves directly.
Such political regimes often are called consociational democracies.53
On the other hand, unstable democracies (ﬂuid ones) are those
where institutions are too much in a state of ﬂux. Here, we are
generally talking about the new or so-called “ﬂedgling” democracies
that exist in great abundance in “New Europe” and parts of South
America. Unlike their overly stable counterparts in “Old Europe”
and a few South American countries, these unstable democracies are
the product of the wave of democratization that followed the collapse
of Communism in Eastern Europe and end of military dictatorships
in Latin America.
The distinguishing characteristics of overly stable and unstable
democracies are fairly clear, although there is no agreement as to
exactly what ingredients go into the making of a stable democracy.54
In overly stable democracies, political life is dominated by a small
number of parties, and their leaders who negotiate long-term power
sharing relationships with each other. Although such arrangements
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often do ensure political stability and guarantee social peace in the
short-run, their long-run effect is to marginalize groups of people
who lie outside the core coalition. For example, such coalitions
effectively governed Austria and Venezuela for decades until they
were subjected to the populist assaults of Jorg Haider and Hugo
Chavez.
Political life in unstable democracies often is colored by the
presence of large numbers of parties with highly divergent ideologies,
no one or two of which can regularly capture a majority share of the
vote. Such polarized and unstable party relationships may be part
of a larger environment that itself is unstable. For example, such an
environment can include hostile relationships between the various
branches of government and lack of public faith in governing
institutions.
In order to understand how populism works, we need to think of
overly stable and unstable democracies as occupying the two ends of
an unbalanced U-curve, with stable democracies in the middle. (See
Figure 1.) The paths to the rise of populism will vary depending on
the type of representative democracy in which populist processes are
to be found. In overly stable democracies, the difﬁculties involved in
populist representation of “the people’s” interest within the political
system means that populists must bypass traditional institutions and
attempt to achieve power through the use of theatrical rhetoric and
direct action. In stable democracies, populism is eventually absorbed
into the mainstream of politics. And in unstable democracies, the
absence of strong and stable democratic institutions means that
populism simply ﬂows right through them. (See Figure 2.)
THE PRESENT-DAY POPULIST ENVIRONMENT
All representative democracies produce populists, and all of these
populists share the common characteristics of charisma, dynamism,
and “curb appeal” to a popular constituency (“the people”). And in
all cases, these populists cater to people who view them as providing
answers to problems that elite politicians are believed to be ignoring.
However, there are considerable differences in the speciﬁc nature of
the local environment in different regions within Europe and South
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REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

NUMBER OF COUNTRIES

FOR EXAMPLE:
MUCH OF "NEW EUROPE"
AND LARGE PARTS OF SOUTH
AMERICA

FOR EXAMPLE:
MUCH OF "OLD EUROPE"
AND A FEW COUNTRIES IN
SOUTH AMERICA

FOR EXAMPLE:
CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND
ENGLAND

OVERLY STABLE (RIGID)

STABLE

UNSTABLE

STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS

Figure 1. Representative Democracies in Europe
and South America.
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PATHS FOR THE RISE OF POPULISM

OVERLY STABLE (RIGID)

STABLE

UNSTABLE

TYPE OF DEMOCRACY

= DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

= THE RISE OF POPULISM

Figure 2. Paths for the Rise of Populism in Europe
and South America.
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America that fuels populist success. The most important of these
differences are:
• The speciﬁc features of a region or country’s representative
democracies―particularly whether they are overly stable,
stable or unstable;
• The speciﬁc manner in which the stresses and uncertainties
associated with globalization affect a particular local
population; and,
• The speciﬁc nature of the constituency that the populist
politician is appealing to and what “the people” see as the
essence of their identity.
When examining the present-day populist environment in
Europe and South America, it is useful to break each down into two
subregions. Europe can be viewed as consisting of “Old Europe,”
and “New Europe,” and South America of the Southern Cone
and the Andean Region. Each of these subregions has its own
distinctive social, economic, and cultural characteristics; and these
characteristics, in turn, affect the way in which populism manifests
itself.
“Old Europe.”
“Old Europe” consists of those countries that are in the western
part of the continent, and whose political and economic systems
were shaped during the Cold War.55 As a response to the burst of
populist turbulence associated with the rise of Fascism during the
interwar years, there was a tendency to construct democracies
that would be more resistant to populist impulses. This, combined
with the need to ﬁnd solutions to labor management problems in
highly industrialized economies, led to the creation of rather rigid
institutional structures normally dominated and controlled by a
handful of political parties.
Within “Old Europe,” many groups (industrial workers,
small shopkeepers, farmers) are being exposed to the stresses and
uncertainties associated with globalization’s competitive pressures.
As the EU has expanded from 15 members to 25, companies are
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moving their production facilities to the east to take advantage of
lower labor costs in countries such as Poland and the Slovak Republic.
Take, for example, the case of automobile production. While the
Slovak Republic is rapidly becoming the “New Germany” in terms of
automobile production, plants are being closed in Germany itself.56
The political base on which populist movements build in “Old
Europe” is extremely diverse in terms of its social and economic
composition. It consists of groups of people such as those mentioned
above that are increasingly unhappy about their economic condition.
But it also taps into other constituencies that are worried about
the challenge that immigration presents to the preservation of
basic national values and identities. Public dissatisfaction seems
to be everywhere, for example, as expressed with regard to cuts in
national welfare beneﬁts and failure to deal with corruption within
the EU bureaucracy. These multiple sources of popular grievance
recently have spawned a kaleidoscopic array of new parties and
movements.
“Old Europe” is now home to a number of populist politicians,
and also many others who are mislabeled as “populist” simply
because they express right-wing points of view.57 In the category
of “real populists,” we can place people like the late Pim Fortuyn
(Netherlands), Jean Marie Le Pen (France), and Jorg Haider (Austria).
And there are also a number of populists emerging as players within
the EU as well as within various local jurisdictions. These include
ﬁgures such as “Euro-populist” Hans Peter Martin, an Austrian
journalist and member of the European Parliament, who campaigns
against corruption.58
“New Europe.”
The countries of the “New Europe” lie in the central and eastern
parts of the continent. Their political and economic systems also
were shaped by the Cold War but in ways quite different from
that of their western neighbors. Representative democracies in the
“New Europe” are new because they emerged from the ashes of the
Soviet bloc. Unlike “Old Europe” where democratic institutions
were designed after World War II to resist populist impulses and
ensure labor-management peace, in the “New Europe” they build
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on a foundation of mass political movements (such as Solidarity in
Poland) that opposed the former Communist authoritarian regimes.
Just as in “Old Europe,” many groups in the “New Europe” are
being exposed to the competitive pressures of globalization and
open markets. This is particularly true of miners, industrial workers
in large Soviet-era factories, and farmers. Among such groups of
people, these pressures have led to high levels of unemployment
and low levels of economic growth.59 The result has been a feeling
among a signiﬁcant part of the population that the market-oriented
economic policies put into place during the 1990s by the region’s new
democratic governments unfairly were exposing “the people” to the
stresses and uncertainties associated with the global marketplace.60
While Western Europe is home to many populists, the Central
and Eastern European countries provide the perfect political
environment for this phenomenon today. During the Communist
era, there was a conscious effort to repress feelings of national
identity among Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians,
and other regional groups. Attempts then were made to create a
larger overarching working class identity along the lines of MarxistLeninist thought. In the process, the people had been stripped of
their sense of common history, customs, and political institutions.
They thus became the perfect “available mass” for future populists
to build their movements upon.61
The lack of trust that citizens of the “New Europe” have in
their democratic institutions (see Table 1) is reﬂected in low voter
turnout for recent elections. For example, only 21 percent of eligible
voters in Poland and 16 percent in Slovakia turned out for the June
2004 European Parliamentary elections. It is no coincidence that
the same countries that saw low voter turnout for these elections
also experienced a rise in populist success at the ballot box. Polish
populist Andrezej Lepper and his Self-Defense Party did extremely
well in these elections. This was also the case in Slovakia where
populists Vladimir Meciar (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
[HZDS]) and Roberto Fico (Social Alternative for Slovakia [SMER]
or Direction Party) captured 35 percent of the vote between them.
The various populist parties and politicians found in the “New
Europe” are difﬁcult to classify as left-wing or right-wing since they
invite government intervention on certain issues, but not on others.
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Some populists come from the peasantry and claim to defend their
interests against the “cultural pollution” coming from the West and
from the market forces that threaten to overwhelm “the people.”
Others such as Tymoshenko are self-made business people who
decide it is time to directly market themselves and their ideas. In
either case, they exist in virtually every country in Central and
Eastern Europe.
The Southern Cone.
The Southern Cone is a group of countries in the southernmost
part of South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay).
To many, this region of the world is most closely associated with
populism. More speciﬁcally, they think of Argentina where mid20th century industrialization produced the populist movement
led by Juan and Eva Peron. Their loyal followers were the so-called
“shirtless ones,” poor unemployed rural workers who had moved
to Buenos Aires to try to ﬁnd work in the growing number of
factories.62
The Southern Cone historically has produced a unique kind of
industrial “working class populism” that is signiﬁcantly different
from that found elsewhere in South America. Lying in the temperate
zone, its vast agricultural potential attracted large numbers of
immigrants from European countries such as Germany and Italy.
In turn, these immigrants imported working class attitudes and
ideologies that predisposed them toward fascism when the region
began to industrialize rapidly. Politicians, such as Juan Peron in
Argentina and Getulio Vargas in neighboring Brazil, drew on the
fascist and corporatist doctrines that were prevalent in Europe
during the 1920s and 1930s to build their own populist political
movements.63
The environment within which populism might possibly
reemerge in the Southern Cone differs in another signiﬁcant way
from that which exists in Europe and throughout the rest of South
America. Unlike “New Europe” where Communist parties laid the
groundwork for future bursts of populist turbulence by stripping
away preexisting loyalties and institutions, the military played this
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role in South America. Long and brutal periods of military rule during
the 1970s and 1980s greatly weakened the preexisting structures of
representative democracy.64
Take, for example, the case of Argentina. This country has remained
virtually ungovernable during the half-century since Juan and Eva
Peron came to power in the 1940s. Periods of military rule have been
punctuated by episodic outbreaks of renewed populism and leftwing urban guerrilla warfare. However, since their military defeat
by the British in the Falkland Islands War (1982), the armed forces
have stayed out of politics. Unfortunately, subsequent civilian
efforts to establish a fully functioning representative democracy
and to reinvigorate the economy have not proven successful. As
a consequence, the government defaulted on some $100 billion
in national debt in 2001, the largest default in the history of any
sovereign country.
Today, Argentine democracy is in deep trouble. Not only are
there many political parties vying for power, but there are also
numerous factional groupings within these parties. In this particular
case, democratic structures are being weakened further by ongoing
crises within both the executive and judicial branches. Argentina
has been “governed” by six different presidents in the past 4 years,
and half the members of the Supreme Court have been forced from
ofﬁce.65
Currently, economic conditions in Southern Cone countries are
improving and may help allay the fears of those who expect to see
another burst of populist turbulence in the near future. These fears
may be further allayed by the fact that no real charismatic populists
like President Chavez are currently in power there. However, the
region’s historical association with populism, its continuing economic
problems, and the growing weakness of traditional political parties
suggest that a future burst of turbulence is far from out of the
question. The history of populist movements shows that they can
emerge “out of nowhere.”
The Andean Region.
The “industrial populism” historically found in the Southern Cone
is not replicated in the Andean Region. Rather, Peruvian, Bolivian,
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Ecuadorean, and even to a certain extent Venezuelan populism
has its roots in that the Andean mountain chain is the homeland of
millions of indigenous people. Unlike the Southern Cone, the Andes
in a very real sense have been occupied since the Spanish Conquest.66
From this perspective, many populist movements in the region seek
to express the indigenous identities of politically disenfranchised
and culturally repressed peoples.67
The Andean Region has a rich history of populist expression
through such political ﬁgures as Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in
Peru, Romulo Bethancourt in Venezuela, and Jose Maria Velasco
Ibarra in Ecuador.68 Often these populists were of mixed racial
background and emerged from either existing political parties or
from the military to give partial political expression to the cultural
identity of marginalized groups. However, in recent years, this
process has been vastly accelerated under pressure from the forces
of globalization. Particularly hard hit have been small agricultural
producers who have been buffeted by exposure to global markets.69
Under such conditions, the historically disenfranchised and
poverty-stricken peoples of the Andes have gravitated toward
those populist politicians who are not viewed as subservient to
the traditional Spanish and mestizo elites. As one observer of the
Andean political scene has noted, they are increasingly drawn to
indigenous populists who carry a message of “economic nationalism,
anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, and anti-globalization.”70 The
increasing convergence of anti-Americanism and nationalism in
the minds of growing numbers of indigenous people should be a
grave concern for those charged with the furtherance of U.S. policy
interests in the Andes.71
Take, for example, the case of Bolivia. When prices for commodities such as tin collapsed during the 1980s, the government
reacted by instituting market reforms. During the 1990s, these
reforms were “deepened” through measures such as the privatization
of some communal water rights. These measures, coupled with
efforts to reduce acreage devoted to the growing of coca and to
increase gas production, led to a major burst of populism.72 The
populist politician most closely associated with this burst is Evo
Morales, the Aymara leader of the Movement toward Socialism
(MAS) and a former candidate for the presidency of the country.
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Elsewhere in the Andes, the situation is equally unstable. In
Peru, President Alejandro Toledo put down an uprising in January
2005 by a former army major who leads a movement that combines
militarism with ethnic nationalism.73 And in Ecuador, President Lucio
Gutierrez faces a deteriorating political situation that eventually
could make him the fourth of the country’s leaders to be forced into
exile over the past decade. He continues to cling to power by virtue
of a political alliance with several powerful populist politicians.
Venezuela deserves special attention because President Chavez
is already governing his country.74 In fact, he in many ways serves as
our best example of the strategic implications that may arise when a
“sitting” populist politician begins to develop ties to other aspiring
populist politicians in the region or globally. Venezuela is also an
important case because the country has had a unique experience with
populism. It is a form of populism that combines Latin American,
indigenous Andean and Afro-Caribbean elements. In this sense,
President Chavez’s brand of populism could potentially have the
broadest appeal across various racial and cultural groups of any
populist movement currently existing in the Americas.75
SOME SCENARIOS FOR THE MID-TERM (5-10 YEARS)
A burst of populist turbulence in Europe and/or South America
is something that, by deﬁnition, would not be easy for security
planners to prepare for at the last minute. And given populism’s
inherent instability and unpredictability, it is probably best dealt with
in advance through exercises that look at the various combinations
and permutations of this phenomenon that might conceivably arise
rather than at speciﬁc anticipated events. Just because we cannot
envision the precise paths that populist movements will take does
not mean that we should ignore populism’s strategic implications.
These can be examined by using scenarios.
What are scenarios and how do we use them? Simply put, they
are alternative visions of the future that are based on plausible
assumptions about underlying conditions that might lead to
their eventual creation.76 For purposes of strategic planning, it is
not necessary (or even desirable) that a particular scenario reﬂect
collective wisdom about the most likely future outcome. Rather, it is
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only necessary that it be a plausible one, given the “logic” of some
already visible trend or condition such as the large-scale challenges
facing many traditional representative democracies.
Scenarios have been used for decades by strategic planners who
cannot afford to ignore low probability future events that could
have undesirable or even catastrophic consequences. And while not
all of the scenarios discussed below would necessarily have such
consequences, they are at least worth thinking about. The following
regional scenarios concerning populism are offered to the security
community for those concerned with examining the future under
conditions of low probability but potentially very high impact.
Imagine a future in which the Andean Region is politically
dominated by an informal alliance between two or three indigenous
populist heads of state. These leaders would represent (or could
at least claim to represent) the millions of indigenous people who
historically have been marginalized and disenfranchised by Spanish
and mestizo elites.
A conventional ﬁrst look at the region usually builds around
a “Fire in the Andes” scenario. This is to say that it envisions the
emergence of more indigenous guerrilla movements like Sendero
Luminoso in Peru that attempt to undermine and eventually topple
existing elite-dominated democracies from the outside. Increasingly,
however, such scenarios seem less compelling than one that
incorporates elements of populism. In a region where representative
democratic institutions exist within weak or even failing states, it
seems more likely that these democratic institutions themselves will
serve as the path to power for populist-led indigenous peoples.77
Such a burst of indigenous populist turbulence in the Andean
Region would be revolutionary and transformative rather than just
politics as usual. It would be revolutionary and transformative
because representative democratic institutions could be used not
only as a populist path to political power, but also as a means of
transforming the racial identity of countries themselves. Given
centuries of repression, it is likely that indigenous populists would
be under great pressure to “invert the racial pyramid” in ways that
could drastically affect previously dominant groups. The result
could easily be inter-racial civil wars, with serious implications for
the U.S. and global peacemaking community. Imagine how the
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strategic interests of the United States might be affected in a region
where democratically elected indigenous populist leaders had the
power and legitimacy to reorient foreign policy so as best to serve the
perceived economic interests of their electoral constituency.78 And
further imagine what the implications might be if broader regional
and even transregional alliances were forged between such populist
leaders.79 Under such conditions, U.S. policymakers eventually might
have to deal with several new “failed states” resulting from efforts
by previously-dominant elites to protect their interests through
involvement in secessionist movements or movements to establish
greater regional autonomy.80
If a scenario envisioning the impact of revolutionary and hence
transformative populism increasingly is compelling for the Andes,
what about the Southern Cone? Can we envision a situation in
which we might see populist “Pyrotechnics on the Pampas?” While
democratic governments in this group of South American countries
are under tremendous pressure due to economic forces associated
with globalization, the situation gradually is improving.81 However,
the institutions of democracy remain weak, and loyalties to traditional
political parties are rapidly eroding. Is it conceivable that a burst of
populist turbulence might occur in this region?
Picture a scenario in which populist leaders in several Southern
Cone countries emerge from the ashes of failing representative
democracies. Certainly, political developments in Argentina, Chile,
and Uruguay often have moved in tandem in the past, as was the
case when military leaders with similar programs governed in
all three following a series of coups during the 1970s.82 The dire
economic conditions associated with the “overhang” from the debt
crisis in Argentina and Uruguay, together with accelerating political
change there, suggest that these two countries might be fertile
ground for populists.83 And such populists could draw on deep
currents of resentment among ordinary people. Many Argentines
and Uruguayans believe that great injustice has been done to them
by those foreign countries and global institutions that they view as
controlling their national destiny.84
Furthermore, a scenario involving a more comprehensive burst
of populist turbulence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
is certainly imaginable. Given the close personal relationship
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that already exists between two “sitting populists” in Cuba and
Venezuela (Castro and Chavez), such a development might occur
if and when they found common ground to share with an emerging
new generation of regional populist leaders. In this process,
President Chavez would be the most likely intermediary between
populist generations because his vision for the future of the Americas
incorporates the broadest range of economic, cultural, and racial
themes.
On the surface, a scenario built upon the premise of a future burst
of populist turbulence in Europe would seem less compelling than
one for South America. Over the past half-century, Western European
politicians such as Robert Schuman have done a remarkable job of
ﬁrst imagining a uniﬁed Europe and then going about the much more
difﬁcult task of actually constructing one. The eventual result was
creation of the EU, a community of 25 representative democracies that
has managed to bridge what once seemed to be the insurmountable
gap dividing Europeans politically during the Cold War.
However, as pointed out earlier, the great paradox of modern
regional governance is that the tremendous success that Europeans
have experienced in promoting democratization has sown the seeds
for potential future problems. While Europe’s “democratic space”
has been vastly expanded, the country-level democracies which
inhabit that space have become progressively weaker. Both eroding
representative democratic institutions in Western Europe and fragile
new ones in Central and Eastern Europe are increasingly at risk of
being overwhelmed by populist-led demands for protection of “the
people” from the forces of change.
Picture a scenario in which a future burst of populist turbulence
in Europe is grounded in a number of developments that are viewed
by most observers as reﬂecting the region’s success rather than its
failure to spread democracy and stimulate economic growth. Such
developments include ongoing enlargement processes, efforts to
ratify a new constitution, and others to increase the region’s level of
competitiveness in the global economy. 85
Take, for example, the political impact of enlargement. Most
observers believe that the recent rapid expansion of the EU is a “net
plus” with regard to consolidating regional democratic institutions.
However, enlargement also is sowing the seeds of a populist reaction
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to it. A high level of anxiety exists among many Europeans regarding
where this seemingly inexorable drive for further expansion
eventually will lead.86 And the EU’s recent agreement to launch
accession talks with Turkey has raised levels of anxiety even further.
The successful conclusion of these talks would result in the addition
of a Muslim country to the EU whose population is about the size
of Germany. Not only does this raise the specter of future job losses
among Europe’s people, but also of the possible future loss of the
region’s historically Christian identity.87
Imagine a scenario in which a number of charismatic populist
politicians are able to bond with “the people” by tapping into the
rich vein of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and apprehension that has
been created by the recent activities of that rapidly expanding
“quasi-state” known as the EU. Picture a situation in which several
more terrorist incidents like the 2004 Madrid train bombing and the
assassination of Dutch ﬁlmmaker Theo Van Gogh occur in rapid
succession.88 And then throw into this scenic “witches’ brew” the
possibility of continued economic stagnation in Europe. It is not
hard to imagine how the intersection of such conditions and events
could produce a burst of populist turbulence that would be regionwide.89
A burst of populist turbulence in Europe would have much
more serious security implications for the United States than one in
South America because the populists eventually coming to power
could determine the policy direction of much stronger countries.
Whereas in the Andean region, populism threatens to further
undermine representative democracy in weak countries in ways that
might eventually lead to their collapse, populism in Europe could
conceivably strengthen country-level institutions. This was certainly
the historical experience in Europe during its ﬁrst encounter with
populism during the 1920s and 1930s.
Picture then, if you will, a Europe where majority national groups
in various countries look inward rather than “outward” to the EU
for solutions to their problems. Populist politicians increasingly are
likely to identify various internal and external groups who can be
used to “put a human face” on the stresses and anxieties that afﬂict
common people. Unfortunately, this human face would probably
be that of “Old Europe’s” population of immigrant workers (Turks,
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Kurds, Arabs, Asians, Africans) and “New Europe’s” population
of minority groups such as the Roma.90 The responsibility for the
problems that these groups are alleged to have created would be laid
at the feet of elite politicians acting in consort with the incompetent
bureaucrats of the EU.
Is this too stark a set of scenarios for the future of representative
democracy in Europe and South America? Perhaps it is so. On the
one hand, the United States faces a real dilemma in terms of squaring
our support for existing representative democracies with the populist
politicians and their new demands that such democracies often
produce in overly stable or unstable settings. On the other, we have
a real opportunity to inﬂuence such populist movements in ways
that not only stabilize but also potentially improve the performance
of the representative democracies of which they are a part.
But if there is one thing that the history of strategic planning
teaches, it is that such hopes and aspirations for a better world
should not be confused and conﬂated with the realities on which
policy should be based.91 In the case of contemporary Europe and
South America, this underlying reality is one where “the people”
increasingly are looking for charismatic saviors to emerge who can
free popular will from the constraints imposed by representative
democratic institutions.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Populism is a political phenomenon that has received little
attention within the U.S. security community. The primary reason
is because its dynamic, unstable, and ephemeral nature makes it
particularly hard to “see” and to evaluate. Because populists by
deﬁnition operate within the political context of representative
democratic governments, they often take on the “coloration” and
assume the legitimacy accruing to these governments. This makes
them difﬁcult to deal with when they adopt policies that are at odds
with those of the United States.
Despite the difﬁculties of assessing the strategic implications of
populism, it is important to do so for a number of reasons. Precisely
because post-Cold War Europe and Latin America are now full of
representative democracies, there is more potential for future bursts
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of populist turbulence in both regions. Populist politicians have
already altered the U.S. military’s operating environment in Europe
and Latin America and are likely to alter it much more dramatically.
Were bursts of populist turbulence to occur on a large scale, they
would have the potential of undermining the democratic core of
representative democracies in two regions of the world that are vital
to the protection of U.S. global security interests. And in some South
American countries, it could even result in state failure.92
For the above-mentioned reasons, the potential rise of populism
should not be viewed as posing just another speciﬁc type of security
challenge (traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive) within
the current matrix.93 Rather, it should be viewed as posing a challenge
to the underlying political “substructure” that gives us the collective
capability and legitimacy to deal with all of these problems. In the
ﬁnal analysis, the ability of the United States to project power in order
to deal with the whole spectrum of security problems is contingent
upon our ability to deal with the potential challenge emerging from
within representative democracy itself.
With these points in mind, U.S. policymakers should:
1. Consider possible bursts of populist turbulence to be on a par with
other major security challenges in terms of future planning. This would
suggest that strategic planners will need to educate themselves
concerning the history and current nature of populism, particularly
in their regional areas of responsibility. Policymakers should
consider revising the U.S. National Security Strategy so as to reﬂect
the importance of political systems and dynamics that cannot be
classiﬁed as either fully democratic or totalitarian.
2. Focus policy on containing populist movements before they come to
power. Populists by deﬁnition use direct forms of political action to
gain power within representative democracies and are thus inclined
to continue using such techniques once power has been achieved.
Although it may not always be easy or diplomatically feasible to
inﬂuence the trajectory of populist politicians, efforts should be made
to do so. The ultimate goal of policy should be to aid our democratic
allies in their efforts to “mainstream” populist politicians and their
movements.
3. Avoid forming alliances of convenience with populists. In some
cases, populist politicians in Europe and South America may support
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U.S. short-term political or military goals in order to “gain traction”
domestically and/or internationally. Given the importance that
preserving the institutional integrity of representative democracy
has with regard to the achievement of long-term U.S. security goals,
strategic thinkers should resist the temptation to sacriﬁce these goals
for any short-term gain.
4. Conﬁgure U.S. military forces so that they are capable of dealing with
the wide variety of challenges that individual populists or a larger burst of
turbulence might present. Depending on the country and region, such
challenges could run the gamut from state failure to rapid changes
in the identities and associated strategic interests of powerful and
internally coherent states. Although determination of the precise
nature of such conﬁgurations is the purview of military experts, the
possibility of future bursts of populist turbulence would seem to call
for preservation of the broadest range of combat capabilities.
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APPENDIX
POPULIST BIOGRAPHIES

HUGO CHAVEZ was born in 1954 in Sabaneta, a small town in
Venezuela’s interior where the Andes meet the lowland plains.
The son of middle-class schoolteachers, he attended Venezuela’s
military academy and graduated in 1975. Having risen to the rank
of lieutenant colonel in the army, he participated in an unsuccessful
coup against President Carlos Andres Perez in 1992 that resulted in a
short jail term. After his release from prison in 1994, he successfully
built a political movement which led to his election to the presidency
in 1998. Since that time, the country has been in a state of perpetual
turmoil as Chavez has moved to consolidate his hold on power and
his political opponents have sought to oust him through an attempted
coup and subsequent referendum.
W. S. P. (PIM) FORTUYN was born in the Netherlands in 1948 into
a Catholic family. He became a professor of sociology, teaching ﬁrst
at the University of Groningen in the north, and later at Erasmus
University in Rotterdam. During the 1990s, he gained a reputation as
an outspoken advocate for gay rights, particularly after the publication
of his book, Babyboomers, in 1998. Dr. Pim became involved in politics
in 2001, joining one of Europe’s new parties that challenged the
establishment on issues such as immigration. His meteoric political
ascent ended in May 2002 when he was assassinated by an animal
rights activist just before Dutch parliamentary elections.
EVO MORALES was born in 1959 in the Bolivian province of Oruro.
His parents were traditional Aymara peasant farmers, who were
trying to raise seven children in the extremely harsh conditions
prevailing throughout much of the Andes. Forced to move from
his home province because of family problems and economic
circumstance, he sought land for himself elsewhere. Finally, he
settled in Chapare, where he got involved in the union movement
which pitted coco-growing peasants against a succession of Bolivian
governments that supported U.S. policy in the War on Drugs. As
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a representative of this part of the peasant class, he ran for the
presidency in 2002 against Gonzalo Sanchex de Lozada, the architect
of Bolivia’s neo-liberal economic reforms. Although he lost that
election, he has remained an important player in Bolivian politics.
YULIA TYMOSHENKO was born in 1963 in rural Ukraine when
it was still part of the Soviet Union. Raised by her single mother,
she married and had a child while in her teens. Following Ukraine’s
independence, she was able to parlay opportunities presented to
her through personal contacts into a ﬁnancial empire in the energy
sector. After serving as deputy prime minister of the country, she
was accused by her political enemies of illicit enrichment and thrown
in jail. Considered a martyr by her adoring fans, she emerged from
jail politically stronger. This so-called “Goddess of the Orange
Revolution” has played an important role as a close ally of Victor
Yushchenko in his recently successful bid to become President.
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